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Bullies on the Bench 
Douglas R. Richmond∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Former United States District Judge Samuel B. Kent, who sat 
in Galveston, Texas, had little patience for lawyers he perceived as 
careless or incompetent.1 He freely chastised such lawyers in his 
orders and, thanks to the legal media and the internet, some of his 
more colorful decisions attracted wide attention among members 
of the bar. Consider, for example, his order denying a defendant’s 
motion to transfer venue in Labor Force, Inc. v. Jacintoport 
Corp.,2 in which the hapless defense lawyer confused the transfer 
of a matter within divisions of a judicial district with a motion to 
transfer venue between districts, and, in doing so, apparently 
misread a federal venue statute. As Judge Kent angrily wrote in his 
order: “Manifestly, any person with even a correspondence-course 
level understanding of federal practice and procedure would 
recognize that Defendant’s Motion [was] patently insipid, 
ludicrous and utterly and unequivocally without any merit 
whatsoever.”3 Continuing, Judge Kent quoted the portion of the 
statute that the defendant “hopelessly incorrectly interpreted and 
cited” and emphasized the relevant language, as the emphasis was 
“apparently needed by blithering counsel.”4 He then 
“emphatically” denied the defendant’s “obnoxiously ancient, 
boilerplate, inane” motion and disqualified the defense lawyer “for 
cause . . . for submitting [such] asinine tripe.”5  
Consistent with his tone in the Labor Force case, Judge Kent 
allegedly used to brag about his ability to intimidate people and 
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 1. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670–
72 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (mocking the work of the lawyers for both parties).  
 2. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Venue and 
Ordering Substitution of Counsel-of-Record, Labor Force, Inc. v. Jacintoport 
Corp., et al., Civ. Action No. G-01-058 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 2001) (on file with 
the author). 
 3. Id. at 1. 
 4. Id. at 2. 
 5. Id. 
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reportedly boasted that “‘everyone was afraid of him.’”6 His 
judicial career eventually flamed out in spectacular fashion. He 
was accused of sexually assaulting two women on his staff and 
was sentenced to nearly three years in prison after he pled guilty to 
one count of obstruction of justice as part of a plea bargain in 
exchange for the dismissal of multiple sex crime charges.7 
Another federal judge in Texas, Sam Sparks, caused a stir in 
August 2011 when his order concerning a party’s poorly-conceived 
motion to quash a subpoena quickly went viral.8 “You are invited 
to a kindergarten party,” he announced in the order, a sarcastic 
mandate necessitated by the lawyers’ inability “to practice law at 
the level of a first year law student.”9 He further wrote: “Invitation 
to this exclusive event is not RSVP. Please remember to bring a 
sack lunch! The United States Marshals have beds available . . . so 
you may wish to bring a toothbrush in case the party runs late.”10 
Judge Sparks’s sarcasm drew an e-mail rebuke from a Fifth Circuit 
colleague, who found the order “not funny,” and described it as “so 
caustic, demeaning, and gratuitous” that it “cast[] more disrespect 
on the judiciary than on the now-besmirched reputation of the 
counsel.”11 Judge Sparks was unrepentant, saying he had received 
supportive e-mails from hundreds of federal and state judges.12  
Mississippi Chancery Court Judge Talmadge Littlejohn 
achieved notoriety in October 2010 when he jailed a lawyer for 
criminal contempt after the lawyer failed to stand and recite the 
pledge of allegiance in court.13 The lawyer, Danny Lampley, spent 
                                                                                                             
 6. Kent Sentenced to Almost 3 Years in Prison, GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY 
NEWS, May 12, 2009, available at http://galvestondailynews.com/story/137512 
(quoting Judge Kent’s former case manager).  
 7. Id. (noting that Judge Kent had faced five charges for alleged federal 
sex crimes in addition to the obstruction of justice charge); see also Brenda 
Sapino Jeffreys, Former Judge Samuel B. Kent Sentenced to 33 Months in 
Prison, TEXAS LAWYER (May 11, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticle 
FriendlyTX.jsp?id=1202430610099 (reporting the history and resolution of the 
case against Judge Kent).  
 8. Order, Theresa Morris v. John Coker et al., Case Nos. A-11-MC-712-SS 
to -715-SS (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011) (on file with the author). 
 9. Id. at 1–2. 
 10. Id. at 2. 
 11. John Council, 5th Circuit Judge Takes U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks 
to Task in an Email, TEXAS LAWYER (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
tx/PubArticleFriendlyTX.jsp?id=1202514158040.  
 12. Judge Defends Kindergarten Order, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Sept. 27, 
2011, 2:33 p.m. ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/law. 
 13. Holbrook Mohr, Attorney Jailed for Not Reciting Pledge of Allegiance, 
LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp? 
id=1202473224805; Holbrook Mohr & Adrian Sainz, Recite Pledge or Go to 
Jail? Mississippi Lawyer Locked Up, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 8, 2010, available at 
2012] BULLIES ON THE BENCH 327 
 
 
 
approximately five hours in jail before Judge Littlejohn released 
him so he could appear on behalf of another client.14 As Judge 
Littlejohn later acknowledged, his action clearly violated 
Lampley’s First Amendment rights.15 The Mississippi Commission 
on Judicial Performance concluded that Judge Littlejohn violated 
five canons of judicial conduct and a section of the Mississippi 
Constitution.16 Based on Judge Littlejohn’s admission of error and 
his promise to make the recitation of the pledge in his courtroom 
voluntary in the future, the Commission recommended to the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi that it publicly reprimand Judge 
Littlejohn and fine him $100.17 After expressing what might be 
viewed by some observers as insincere concern about the gravity 
of the judge’s misconduct in light of the outcome,18 the Mississippi 
Supreme Court adopted the disappointingly weak sanctions 
recommended by the Commission.19  
Finally, consider the remarks of Justice Frederick L. Brown of 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court at oral argument in Edwards v. 
Labor Relations Commission.20 In Edwards, George Edwards sued 
the National Association of Government Employees (“NAGE”) for 
breaching its duty of fair representation when it did not represent 
him in an earlier proceeding.21 The Massachusetts Labor Relations 
Commission dismissed Edwards’s complaint against NAGE, and 
Edwards appealed. At oral argument, Justice Brown made a series 
of comments to the Commission’s counsel critical of NAGE, its 
president, Kenneth Lyons, and Lyons’s family.22 Justice Brown 
                                                                                                             
 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=13&articleid=2010100
8_13_A8_TUPELO336814.  
 14. Mohr, supra note 13; Mohr & Sainz, supra note 13. 
 15. See Phil West, Tupelo Judge Reprimanded for Pledge of Allegiance 
Incident, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 10, 2011, http://www.commercial 
appeal.com/news/2011/jun/10/tupelo-judge-reprimanded-for-pledge-incident/? 
print=1; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag 
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and 
invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”). 
 16. Commission Findings of Fact and Recommendation, Inquiry 
Concerning a Judge at 3, No. 2010-216 (Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance 
Nov. 30, 2010) (on file with the author).  
 17. Id. at 3–4. 
 18. See Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Littlejohn, 62 So. 3d 
968, 971–72 (Miss. 2011) (discussing the judge’s misconduct).  
 19. Id. at 973.  
 20. 660 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). 
 21. In re Brown, 691 N.E.2d 573, 574 (Mass. 1998). 
 22. Id.  
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stated that Lyons kept his entire family on NAGE’s payroll, 
complained that Lyons and his family were feathering their nests 
financially while NAGE members received nothing for their dues, 
claimed NAGE was a union run amok, and asserted NAGE did not 
truly represent anyone—its leaders collected members’ dues “‘and 
[kept] on stepping and [bought] more condos and [had] more 
expense accounts and [had] fancy banquets.’”23 Lyons learned of 
Justice Brown’s comments and, despite the fact the court affirmed 
the Commission’s judgment for NAGE, complained about Justice 
Brown to the Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct.24 
Ultimately, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court publicly 
reprimanded Justice Brown for his misconduct at oral argument, 
calling his remarks “intemperate, excessive, unjustified by 
anything properly before the court, and gratuitously insulting of 
persons directly and indirectly implicated” in the Edwards case.25  
Judges wield considerable power over lawyers and litigants 
who appear before them. As one judicial ethics scholar has 
explained: 
In litigation, the judge is the maximum boss. Everyone else 
is a supplicant, compelled to engage in stylized 
demonstrations of obeisance. We stand when the judge 
enters and leaves the room. Our “pleadings” are 
“respectfully submitted.” Before speaking, we make sure 
that it “pleases the court.” We obey the judge’s orders and 
we even say “thank you” for adverse rulings.26  
As the foregoing examples regrettably illustrate, however, these 
required trappings of respect do not ensure respectable behavior by 
the judges to whom they are offered.27  
Regulating judges’ demeanors is a difficult task. Judges are 
human and may occasionally display anger or annoyance. The 
crowded dockets and scarce judicial resources common to many 
courts seemingly assure some intemperate conduct from judges.28 
Even judges who enjoy impressive self-control and gracious 
bearings may sometimes lose patience with incompetent or uncivil 
lawyers, or especially difficult or disruptive litigants. Lawyers and 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. at 575 (quoting Justice Brown). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 576. 
 26. Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 11, 12 (2001). 
 27. Id. 
 28. But see JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 3.02, 
at 3–8 (4th ed. 2007) (“Reviewing courts generally have been unwilling to 
consider in mitigation the notion that the judge’s conduct was caused by the 
pressures of heavy court caseloads.”). 
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litigants sometimes incite judges.29 Moreover, judicial candor is a 
highly-valued trait and judges must be allowed some flexibility in 
criticizing the performance of lawyers who appear before them. In 
the same vein, trial and appellate lawyers are generally considered 
to have thick skins; indeed, tolerating judicial criticism is an 
ordinary rigor of litigation practice. It is therefore no wonder that 
judicial conduct commissions and supreme courts do not wish to 
micromanage judges’ courtroom activities or scour their writings 
for evidence of possible misconduct. At the same time, judges are 
held to high standards of conduct,30 and their inability to comply 
with established professional norms erodes public confidence in 
the judiciary.31 As the In re Brown32 court explained:  
For every litigation at least one-half of those involved are 
likely to come away sorely dissatisfied, and every citizen 
has reason to apprehend that one day he might be on the 
losing side of our exercise of judgment. Therefore, this 
arrangement requires an exacting compact between judges 
and the citizenry. It is not enough that we know ourselves 
to be fair and impartial or that we believe this of our 
colleagues. Our power over our fellow citizens requires that 
we appear to be so as well. . . . An impartial manner, 
courtesy, and dignity are the outward sign of that fairness 
and impartiality we ask our fellow citizens, often in the 
most trying of circumstances, to believe we in fact possess. 
. . . 
                                                                                                             
 29. A recent New York Times story described “a blistering courtroom 
session” in a priest abuse case in Philadelphia in which defense lawyers 
“engaged in shouting matches” with Court of Common Pleas Judge Renee 
Hughes. Katharine Q. Seelye, Prosecution Requests Granted in Priests’ Abuse 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/26/us/26philly.html. Judge Hughes reportedly “erupted in fury several 
times, accusing some of the defense lawyers of attacking her integrity and 
telling them to ‘shut up.’” Id.  
 30. Disciplinary Counsel v. Russo, 923 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ohio 2010) 
(“Judges are subject to the highest standards of ethical conduct.”); see also In re 
Dempsey, 29 So. 3d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 2010) (stating that judges “‘should be held 
to higher ethical standards than lawyers by virtue of their position in the 
judiciary and the impact of their conduct on public confidence in an impartial 
justice system’”) (quoting In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001)); In 
re Alessandro, 918 N.E.2d 116, 122 (N.Y. 2009) (observing that judges are held 
to standards of conduct higher than those imposed on the public at large) 
(quoting In re Mazzei, 618 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 1993)).  
 31. Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing 
the Trends, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2004).  
 32. In re Brown, 691 N.E.2d 573 (Mass. 1998). 
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Finally patience and courtesy are required of a judge 
toward those he deals with in his official capacity for the 
additional reason that a judge in that official capacity is 
granted the power to command silence and respect in his 
presence. . . . When a judge berates or acts discourteously 
to those before him—even if he cannot affect their interests 
as litigants—he abuses his power and humiliates those who 
are forbidden to speak back. . . . [T]here are times when a 
judge must and should admonish and express harsh 
judgment to those before him, but they must be limited to 
the necessities of the occasion, being neither gratuitous nor 
irrelevant to it.33 
When judges move beyond occasional displays of anger, 
frustration, or impatience and intentionally abuse or denigrate 
those who appear before them, they may be fairly described as 
bullies. This label is apt because bullying is characterized by a 
power imbalance between bullies and their targets, and judges 
unquestionably wield great power over lawyers, litigants, jurors, 
and witnesses. When individual judges bully, they expose all 
judges to public contempt.34 Although some intemperate behavior 
from judges is to be expected if not welcomed, and not all judicial 
discourtesy or undignified behavior merits professional discipline, 
there is no place for bullies on the bench. This does not mean that 
every abusive judge must be removed from the bench. But judicial 
conduct commissions and superior courts must deal convincingly 
with judges who are bullies. In some cases that may require the 
imposition of substantial discipline, including suspensions without 
pay and removal. More fundamentally, judges and lawyers who are 
inclined to find guilty pleasure in the sort of gratuitous abuse Judge 
Kent dished out in the Labor Force case need to adjust their 
thinking.35  
This Article examines the limits on intemperate behavior by 
judges. Part II discusses the applicable rules of judicial ethics and 
the means by which judges’ conduct is regulated. Part III addresses 
the phenomenon of judicial bullying in more detail, first offering 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. at 576 (footnote omitted). 
 34. See McBryde v. Comm. to Review Cir. Council Conduct & Disability 
Orders of the Judicial Conf. of the United States, 264 F.3d 52, 66 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“Arrogance and bullying by individual judges expose the judicial branch 
to the citizens’ justifiable contempt.”).  
 35. See Lubet, supra note 26, at 12 (observing that many lawyers enjoyed 
Judge Kent’s caustic wit and that judges delighted in his similarly harsh opinion 
ridiculing the lawyers for both parties in Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147 
F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2001), discussed in detail at infra Part III.B).  
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obvious examples of such misconduct and then exploring the 
misuse of humor in judicial opinions, arguing that when attempts 
at judicial humor turn into ridicule they also count as bullying. In 
doing so, it uses one of Judge Kent’s best-known opinions to 
illustrate the point.  
II. REGULATING JUDICIAL COURTESY 
Judges are required to treat all who appear before them with 
courtesy and dignity, and to similarly exhibit patience. Judges must 
also perform their duties fairly and impartially. A judge’s failure in 
these respects may (a) subject the judge to discipline; or (b) cause a 
higher court to reverse the judge’s decision and reassign the case 
upon remand.  
A. Judicial Conduct Rules Governing Abusive, Discourteous, or 
Intemperate Behavior  
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct furnishes standards for 
the ethical conduct of judges and establishes a basis for the 
regulation of judicial behavior by judicial conduct commissions 
and courts.36 The Model Code is the successor to the Canons of 
Judicial Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 
1924.37 The ABA substantially revised the Model Code in 2007. 
Before the 2007 revision, the Model Code had not been 
comprehensively revised since 1990, although specific provisions 
were amended in 1997, 1999 and 2003.38 The Model Code has 
long included provisions intended to aid in the regulation of 
judges’ discourteous and intemperate behavior.39 Prominently, 
Canon 3(B)(4) of the 1990 version of the Model Code established 
that a judge “shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in 
an official capacity.”40 In 1999, the ABA amended Canon 3(B)(4) 
                                                                                                             
 36. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble at 1 (2011). 
 37. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the 
Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 497, 524 (2008).  
 38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface at xii (2011). 
 39. Although such cases are rare, judges may be disciplined for abusive or 
intemperate conduct directed at other judges. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning 
a Judge, 566 S.E.2d 310, 314, 316 (Ga. 2002) (retaliating against a subordinate 
judge); Nebraska ex rel. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications v. Jones, 581 
N.W.2d 876, 883–92 (Neb. 1998) (removing a judge from office for, among 
other offenses, repeated abuse of a fellow judge).  
 40. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(4) (1990). 
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to require judges to mandate “similar conduct of lawyers, and of 
staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s control.”41 
Rule 2.8(B) of the 2007 Model Code contains the identical 
requirement.42 More generally, earlier versions of the Model Code 
provided in Canon 2(A) that a judge “shall respect and comply 
with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary.”43 This requirement is captured in Rule 2.2 of the 2007 
Model Code, which states that a judge “shall uphold and apply the 
law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and 
impartially.”44 
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges contains similar 
provisions. Canon 2A of the Federal Code tracks both 1990 Model 
Code Canon 2(A) and 2007 Model Code Rule 2.2.45 Canon 3B(3) 
of the Federal Code tracks Canon 3(B)(4) of the 1990 Model Code 
and Rule 2.8(B) of the 2007 Model Code.46  
Judges have been sanctioned under these rules for engaging in 
a variety of discourteous behaviors.47 In Disciplinary Counsel v. 
                                                                                                             
 41. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(4) (1999). 
 42. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2007) (“A judge shall 
be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers…and 
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require 
similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others subject to the 
judge’s direction and control.”). 
 43. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (1999). 
 44. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2007). 
 45. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2A (2009). 
 46. Id. Canon 3A(3). 
 47. See, e.g., In re Flournoy, 990 P.2d 642, 645 (Ariz. 1999) (finding that 
the judge’s regular and well-known temper tantrums, frequent abuses of 
lawyers, and improper treatment of staff and witnesses, violated Canons 2(A) 
and 3(B)(4), among others); Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906 
P.2d 1260, 1269–70 (Cal. 1995) (rejecting judge’s defense that his rudeness and 
disrespectful behavior merely evidenced his “assertive judicial style”); In re 
Newton, 758 So. 2d 107, 108–09 (Fla. 2000) (reprimanding a former judge who 
was repeatedly abusive, demeaning, rude, sarcastic and even vengeful toward 
lawyers, parties and witnesses who appeared before her); In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 
631, 632–33, 638–39 (Fla. 2000) (finding that a judge violated Canon 3(B)(4), 
among others, through a pattern of abusive and hostile conduct toward lawyers, 
parties, witnesses, court personnel and other judges, and accordingly removing 
him from the bench); In re Perry, 586 So. 2d 1054, 1054–55 (Fla. 1991) 
(reprimanding a judge who “engaged in verbal abuse and intimidation of 
attorneys, witnesses, and parties” for violating Canons 2(A) and 3(A)(3), the 
latter being identical to Canon 3(B)(4) of the Model Code); In re Inquiry 
Concerning Fowler, 696 S.E.2d 644, 646, n.8 (Ga. 2010) (removing from office 
a probate judge who “routinely used rude, abusive, and insulting language 
towards parties”); In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 793–98 
(Iowa 2000) (removing a judge who had “frequent conflicts with almost all of 
the people with whom she came in contact” and whose broad and deep 
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Parker,48 for example, an Ohio municipal court judge, George 
Parker, was conducting a probation violation hearing when the 
defendant’s mother, who was in the gallery, raised her hand.49 
Judge Parker emphatically instructed the woman to leave the 
courtroom.50 When she gently protested, he again told her to leave 
and threatened to jail her if she did not.51 When she muttered in 
disbelief on her way out of the courtroom, Judge Parker 
immediately called her back, found her in contempt of court, 
sentenced her to one day in jail, and then allowed officers to take 
her away in handcuffs.52 The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that 
Judge Parker “stained the integrity” of the judicial system through 
his “intemperate, unreasonable, and vindictive” decision to eject 
the woman from his courtroom and jail her for contempt, and 
determined that in doing so he violated Canons 2 and 3(B)(4), 
among others.53 
                                                                                                             
 
hostilities “must have touched every aspect of her judicial services,” for 
violating, inter alia, Canon 3(A)(3), which is identical to Model Code Canon 
3(B)(4)); In re Pilshaw, 186 P.3d 708, 709–12 (Kan. 2008) (censuring judge for 
angry outbursts at jurors); In re Lamdin, 948 A.2d 54, 65–68 (Md. 2008) 
(suspending judge for 30 days without pay for repeated instances of 
discourteous and intemperate behavior); In re Brown, 691 N.E.2d 573, 576–78 
(Mass. 1998) (finding that judge violated Massachusetts Canons 2(A) and 
3(A)(3), the latter being identical to Canon 3(B)(4) of the Model Code, for 
harshly critical comments directed at a non-party involved in the litigation); In 
re Moore, 626 N.W.2d 374, 392–93 (Mich. 2001) (suspending a judge for 
among other violations, “impatient, discourteous, critical, and sometimes severe 
attitudes toward jurors, witnesses, counsel, and others present in the 
courtroom”); In re Ramirez, 135 P.3d 230, 231, 234 (N.M. 2006) (disciplining a 
judge who “raised his voice” with a defense attorney appearing before him, 
“prevented the attorney from making her full objections for the record, and 
admonished her in front of her client”); Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 931 
N.E.2d 558, 564 (Ohio 2010) (finding that a judge who became angry with 
lawyer in a chambers conference and told the lawyer that he was “behaving like 
a horse’s ass” violated Canons 2 and 3(B)(4)); In re Walsh, 587 S.E.2d 356, 
360–61 (S.C. 2003) (removing a judge for repeated incidents of intemperance 
for violating Canons 2(A) and 3(B)(4), among many others); In re Fuller, 798 
N.W.2d 408, 413–15, 421–22 (S.D. 2011) (disciplining a trial court judge who 
was demeaning, disrespectful and rude to lawyers and others in his court, 
including one incident in which gave a lawyer “the bird” in open court, causing 
the lawyer’s client great concern about the judge’s fairness); In re Disciplinary 
Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 882–83 (Wash. 2010) (suspending a 
judge for the repeated verbal abuse of pro se litigants).  
 48. Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 876 N.E.2d 556 (Ohio 2007). 
 49. Id. at 560. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 560–61. 
 52. Id. at 561. 
 53. Id. 
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Judge Parker, like so many other judges disciplined under 
Canons 2 and 3(B)(4), was a serial bully.54 In another case, he 
attempted to intimidate a prosecutor into accepting a guilty plea to 
a misdemeanor charge, a lower charge than the prosecutor was 
willing to accept.55 In a domestic violence case, he both humiliated 
the victim and demonstrated bias against her husband in open 
court.56 In many other cases over a two-year period, Judge Parker 
“routinely mistreated those who appeared before him.”57 Among 
other bizarre incidents, he asked a teenage defendant, who was 
Jewish, why he attended a Catholic high school; forced defendants 
who were accused of alcohol-related offenses to admit in open 
court that they were alcoholics; refused to return the cane of a 
defendant—who therefore had to request assistance to leave the 
witness box—on the basis that the defendant had used the cane to 
damage a vehicle, was a repeat offender, and was “snake-bit 
mean;” belittled a prosecutor in a drunk-driving case and 
essentially called her stupid in open court; repeatedly insulted a 
victim–witness advocate; and finally, insisted that a victim of 
domestic violence tell him whether she had forgiven her husband.58  
For Judge Parker’s many violations of Canons 2 and 3(B)(4), 
the Ohio Supreme Court suspended him from practice and from 
serving as a municipal judge for eighteen months without pay.59 In 
an interesting attempt to mitigate his discipline, Judge Parker 
established that his misconduct was attributable to a mental 
disability—narcissistic personality disorder (“NPD”).60 Because 
his expert psychologist testified that NPD was not readily treatable, 
however, the Court declined to afford it significant mitigating 
effect.61 
Similarly, the judge in In re Sloop62 committed several serious 
acts of misconduct, one of which involved a “condescending 
                                                                                                             
 54. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 28, § 3.02, at 3-5 (noting that “most 
judges who have been sanctioned for violating Canon 3 exhibited a pattern of 
misconduct”); see also supra note 47 (listing numerous cases in which the judge 
being disciplined was a serial offender).  
 55. Parker, 876 N.E.2d at 561–62. 
 56. Id. at 563–64. 
 57. Id. at 565. 
 58. Id. at 565–66. 
 59. Id. at 574. 
 60. Id. at 567–69. NPD is “a condition in which people have an inflated 
sense of self-importance and an extreme preoccupation with themselves.” 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, PUBMED HEALTH (Nov. 14, 2010), http:// 
www.ncbi.nlm. nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001930.  
 61. Parker, 876 N.E.2d at 569–70. 
 62. 946 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2007). 
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tirade” directed at a defendant, Ms. Mercano.63 Judge Sloop was 
“rude, abrupt, and abusive” in his dealings with Ms. Mercano, and 
acted more like a prosecutor than a judge during her appearance.64 
He oddly defended his conduct as purposeful and also argued that 
he had not lost his temper.65 The Florida Supreme Court was 
unsure which explanation was worse, but concluded that, either 
way, he had violated Canon 3(B)(4) of the Florida Code of Judicial 
Conduct.66 Although Judge Sloop’s conduct toward Ms. Mercano, 
standing alone, might have warranted punishment short of 
removal, that incident was “merely the latest episode in a judicial 
career marred by displays of anger that ha[d] resulted in warnings 
by the [Judicial Qualifications Commission] and fellow judges to 
Judge Sloop concerning his temper.”67 Accordingly, and because 
more serious misconduct followed this incident just two months 
later, the Court removed him from office.68 
Although Parker and In re Sloop involved judges who were 
accused of multiple instances of misconduct, courts are sometimes 
willing to sanction judges for single incidents of intemperate 
behavior that are sufficiently serious.69 For example, in In re 
Ochoa,70 an Oregon judge, Joseph Ochoa, became enraged when a 
defense lawyer, Edward Dunkerly, went “behind his back” to 
obtain a continuance of a trial so that Dunkerly could accompany 
his family on a European trip.71 Judge Ochoa left Dunkerly a 
voicemail message rescinding the continuance, ordered Dunkerly’s 
client to appear unrepresented while Dunkerly was in Europe, and 
at that hearing disparaged the lawyer to his client.72 Judge Ochoa 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at 1057. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1058–60. 
 69. Judges have also been disciplined for a single incident of intemperate 
behavior where they had a prior disciplinary history. See, e.g., In re Ellender, 16 
So. 3d 351, 358–60 (La. 2010) (suspending a judge for a single incident of 
discourteous behavior while noting that it was the judge’s third disciplinary 
sanction, which the court described as “most troubling”).  
 70. 51 P.3d 605 (Or. 2002).  
 71. Id. at 606. Dunkerly had attempted to obtain a continuance from Judge 
Ochoa, even going to the courthouse to hand-deliver his motion. When 
Dunkerly learned that Judge Ochoa had left the courthouse and would not return 
for five days, however, he was in a tough spot because he needed a speedier 
ruling on his request for a continuance in order to make his travel plans. He thus 
approached the presiding judge who, in turn, directed him to another judge. That 
judge granted Dunkerly’s request for a continuance in Judge Ochoa’s absence. 
Id.  
 72. Id. 
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told the client that Dunkerly wanted a continuance so that he could 
go to Europe “and was probably using the thousands of dollars 
paid to him by the [client’s] family to go to Europe rather than try 
the [client’s] case.”73 Dunkerly rushed back from Europe as soon 
as he retrieved Judge Ochoa’s message, but he was forced to 
withdraw from the representation because the judge’s conduct 
irreparably harmed his relationship with his client.74 When charged 
with misconduct as a result of this incident, Judge Ochoa admitted 
his misconduct and consented to censure.75 The Oregon Supreme 
Court approved the agreement and censured him.76 
In re Hannigan77 is another case in which a single instance of 
intemperate behavior by a judge justified discipline. The opinion in 
In re Hannigan resulted from an administrative proceeding before 
the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct. The judge had 
presided over plea discussions between a prosecutor and a teenage 
defendant in which he called the defendant’s life a “garbage pit,” 
accused her of being stupid and dishonest, mocked her receipt of 
public assistance, and “sarcastically referred to the defendant’s 
‘constitutional right[s] to leave school, to have the community 
support you, to relax, to lay back, . . . to have babies, [and] . . . to 
be stupid.”78 The Commission determined that through “this 
intemperate diatribe” the judge had breached his duty “to be 
patient, dignified, and courteous and conveyed the appearance of 
bias.”79 Declaring it “wrong for a judge to engage in name-calling 
and dehumanizing remarks, particularly to a litigant,” the 
Commission observed that “[e]ven a single instance of intemperate 
language” may support a finding of misconduct.80 Because the 
judge had enjoyed a long and unblemished career on the bench and 
the charged misconduct was an isolated incident, the Commission 
concluded a public warning or admonition was an appropriate 
sanction.81  
Despite their broad wording, Canons 2(A) and 3(B)(4), and 
Rules 2.2 and 2.8(B), are rules of reason.82 Not all discourteous or 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 607. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 1997 WL 809945 (N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Conduct, Dec. 17, 1997). 
 78. Id. at *1–3. 
 79. Id. at *4. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope [5] (2011) (stating that 
“[t]he Rules of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct are rules of reason”); see 
also Green & Roiphe, supra note 37, at 541–542 (elaborating on this view). 
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undignified behavior by judges directed at lawyers, parties, 
witnesses, or others will justify discipline or even charges of 
misconduct.83 Courts and judicial conduct commissions weighing 
judges’ alleged violations should generally consider the context in 
which the challenged conduct took place.84 In Turner v. Turner,85 
for example, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that although a 
trial judge had expressed anger and frustration with a pro se 
litigant during a divorce proceeding, the judge’s conduct did not 
cross the “threshold of impropriety.”86 The Court reached this 
conclusion for two reasons. First, the litigant provoked the judge’s 
comments.87 Second, the litigant took some of the judge’s 
comments out of context and misconstrued others.88 The remarks 
the litigant misconstrued were in fact awkward attempts at humor 
intended to demonstrate empathy.89  
In re Hocking90 nicely illustrates courts’ consideration of the 
facts surrounding judges’ alleged intemperance and their 
willingness to accommodate some unfortunate conduct. In that 
case, the Supreme Court of Michigan evaluated two instances in 
which Judge Hocking’s discourtesy was allegedly unethical.91 The 
first incident involved an exchange between the judge and the 
prosecutor during a sentencing hearing in a sexual assault case.92 
The hearing proceeded properly for substantial time; both sides 
fully argued their positions without interruption.93 As is often the 
case, the prosecution argued the court should adhere to Michigan 
sentencing guidelines, which would result in a long prison term for 
the defendant, and the defendant urged the court to deviate from 
the guidelines and impose a much lighter sentence.94 Although the 
defense and the prosecution had scored the sentencing guidelines 
                                                                                                             
 83. In re Ellender, 16 So. 3d 351, 359 (La. 2010). 
 84. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope [5] (2011) (stating that the 
rules contained in the Model Code should be applied “with due regard for all 
relevant circumstances”). 
 85. No. S-12405, 2009 WL 415586 (Alaska Feb. 18, 2009). 
 86. Id. at *8. 
 87. Id. at *9. 
 88. Id. at *9 n.32. 
 89. See id. at *9 n.32 (discussing one of the offending remarks). 
 90. 546 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. 1996). 
 91. The judge was accused of violating several Michigan canons of judicial 
conduct, including Canon 3(A)(3), which provided in pertinent part that a judge 
“should be patient, dignified and courteous . . . to lawyers,” and Canon 3(A)(8), 
which provided that a judge should “avoid interruptions of counsel in their 
arguments except to clarify their positions, and should not be tempted to the 
unnecessary display of . . . a premature judgment.” Id. at 246 nn. 31–32.  
 92. Id. at 238–39, 241. 
 93. Id. at 241. 
 94. Id. 
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identically, it was apparent that “Judge Hocking had decided to 
lower the scoring.”95 As Judge Hocking began to pronounce the 
sentence, it became clear he intended to depart significantly from 
the sentencing guidelines because he believed they did not 
adequately address the facts of the case.96 The prosecutor, Pamela 
Maas, argued “the scoring of the guidelines was not at issue.”97 In 
a flash, Judge Hocking angrily ordered Maas to sit and stated that 
she could appeal if she did not like what he had to say.98 Then, just 
as quickly, the judge’s demeanor returned to normal and he 
explained why he believed that the sentencing guidelines did not 
control his decision in this case.99 
The second incident involved Judge Hocking’s treatment of a 
lawyer, Elaine Sharp, in post-judgment custody proceedings. Sharp 
represented the father in the case and, after the judge terminated 
the father’s joint custody, she filed a motion for reconsideration. 
After losing that motion, she moved to reinstitute joint custody.100 
While the parties were arguing the second motion, Judge Hocking 
immediately told Sharp that he considered her latest motion to be 
“simply a disguised second motion for rehearing,” and he 
demanded to know in what way the motion was different.101 Sharp 
responded, “[a]ll right, fine,” and then brusquely asked the judge 
what evidence supported his custody determination and inquired 
whether he considered the father’s relationship with the child in 
reaching his decision.102 Saying “that’s enough,” Judge Hocking 
denied the motion to reinstitute joint custody as a frivolous motion 
for reconsideration, and ordered Sharp to pay the mother’s 
attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction.103 Sharp and Judge Hocking 
then embarked on a series of disagreeable and disrespectful 
exchanges, in which both accused the other of being on or from 
another planet (the judge made the first such remark), and which 
concluded with Judge Hocking sentencing Sharp to five days in jail 
and imposing a $250 fine for contempt of court.104 
A majority of the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission 
concluded that Judge Hocking was guilty of misconduct for being 
rude and discourteous to Maas and Sharp, and that those events 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 238. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 243. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 244. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
2012] BULLIES ON THE BENCH 339 
 
 
 
and other misconduct not presently relevant warranted a thirty-day 
unpaid suspension from office.105 Judge Hocking challenged the 
commission’s recommendation in the Michigan Supreme Court.106 
Returning to the Maas exchange, Judge Hocking and the Court 
agreed that the judge lost his temper and should have handled 
Maas’s interruption of his pronouncement more graciously.107 But, 
the court noted, not every “angry retort or act of discourtesy” from 
a judge qualifies as misconduct.108 Rather, the facts of each 
incident must be evaluated separately, and judges are subject to 
discipline only if their conduct is “clearly prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”109 That was not the case here.110 Maas, 
who had been given ample opportunity to explain her views to the 
court on an appropriate sentence, breached established courtroom 
decorum when she interrupted the judge.111 This lapse was perhaps 
understandable given her surprise at the judge’s apparent intent to 
depart downward from the confinement range specified in the 
sentencing guidelines, but her interruption of the judge’s remarks 
clearly breached the “unwritten rules of courtroom etiquette.”112 
Judge Hocking’s reaction to the interruption, although admittedly 
too strong, was understandable under the circumstances.113 
Although the Michigan Supreme Court did not condone Judge 
Hocking’s intemperate comments to Maas, it determined that the 
comments did not rise to the level of judicial misconduct.114 
Judge Hocking’s “caustic and abusive” exchange with Sharp 
was another story.115 While agreeing that the judge had not abused 
his contempt authority, the court characterized his behavior as 
“shockingly injudicious.”116 The court found that Judge Hocking 
instigated the confrontation with Sharp by challenging her to 
explain why her motion was not frivolous, made “caustic 
comments in an abusive tone, and personally attacked” her.117 
Unlike his exchange with Maas, in which he was abrupt and 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. at 236–37. 
 106. Id. at 237. 
 107. Id. at 241. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 242 (quoting MICH. CT. R. 9.205 (West, Westlaw through 2011)).  
 110. Id. (“Having reviewed the videotape of the . . . sentencing, we find that 
the exchange with Ms. Maas was not clearly prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 245. 
 115. Id. at 243. 
 116. Id. at 244. 
 117. Id. 
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momentarily biting, the judge’s persistent exchange with Sharp 
reflected “a total lack of self-control and an antagonistic mindset 
predisposed to unfavorable disposition.”118 Although Sharp 
behaved improperly, the judge unquestionably had the ability to 
regulate her conduct through traditional means, up to and including 
citation for contempt.119 Instead, Judge Hocking behaved so rudely 
that his misconduct was prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.120 
The Maas and Sharp incidents were but two of six instances of 
the judge’s alleged misconduct that the court reviewed.121 
Principally for his conduct toward Sharp, the supreme court 
suspended the judge from office for three days without pay.122 A 
dissenting justice would have exonerated Judge Hocking 
altogether, inasmuch as he lost his temper but once and only then 
with a lawyer who was herself contemptuous and discourteous.123 
“An isolated incident of rudeness,” the dissent contended, should 
be privately reprimanded and, “hopefully, prevented from 
recurring.”124 Although the dissenting justice did not condone 
Judge Hocking’s behavior, and would certainly censure drastic or 
repeated instances of discourteous behavior, he reasoned that the 
court did the judiciary a disservice when it “condemn[ed] human 
failings as judicial misconduct.”125 What the generally thoughtful 
dissent apparently failed to recognize, of course, is that any act of 
misconduct can be characterized as a “human failing.”  
B. Reassignment of Cases Based on Abusive, Discourteous, or 
Intemperate Conduct  
Courts may also police judges’ intemperate conduct outside the 
disciplinary process. For example, an appellate court in remanding 
a case may order that the case be transferred to a different judge.126 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id. at 245. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 245–46. 
 121. Id. at 236–37. 
 122. Id. at 246. 
 123. Id. at 247 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 124. Id. (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 125. Id. (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 126. Federal appellate courts have the authority to reassign cases to different 
district judges as part of their general supervisory powers. Cobell v. 
Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Statutory authority for 
reassignment rests in 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2005), which states: “The Supreme 
Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may . . . remand the cause and 
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such 
2012] BULLIES ON THE BENCH 341 
 
 
 
In other instances, an appellate court may actually reverse a trial 
court judgment as a result of judicial misconduct.127 Two recent 
cases, In re United States,128 and People v. Leggett,129 are 
illustrative. 
In re United States arose out of an evidentiary dispute. The 
district court had repeatedly refused to admit certain evidence the 
government offered, thus leading the government to petition for a 
                                                                                                             
 
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” See 
Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics In the Federal System: A 
Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 204 (2007) (stating that 
section 2106 provides statutory authority for appellate courts’ reassignment of 
cases to different district judges upon remand). Judicial reassignment may be 
appropriate where personal bias or unusual circumstances are established. 
TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 1344 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Smith 
v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1987). In determining whether unusual 
circumstances exist, a court considers (1) “whether the original judge would 
reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty” disregarding 
previously-expressed findings or views “determined to be erroneous or based on 
evidence that must be rejected”; (2) “whether reassignment is advisable to 
preserve the appearance of justice”; and (3) whether any duplication or waste 
attributable to reassignment would outweigh “any gain in preserving the 
appearance of fairness.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 563 (9th 
Cir. 1987)). Reassignment may further be required if “reasonable observers 
could believe that a judicial decision flowed from the judge’s animus toward a 
party rather than from the judge’s application of law to fact.” Cobell, 455 F.3d at 
332. Appellate courts tend to exercise their reassignment authority sparingly. Id. 
(reserving such authority for “extraordinary cases”).  
 127. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 803 So. 2d 787, 788–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (reversing conviction and remanding case for a new trial where the trial 
judge’s rebuke of the defense lawyer prejudiced the jury against defense counsel 
and deprived the defendant of a fair trial); State v. Hayden, 130 P.3d 24, 35 
(Kan. 2006) (reversing defendant’s convictions because trial judge’s pervasively 
intrusive, rude, and sarcastic behavior directed at lawyers deprived the defendant 
of a fair trial); Schmidt v. Bermudez, 5 So. 3d 1064, 1074 (Miss. 2009) 
(reversing and remanding case for a new trial before a new judge based on the 
then-presiding judge’s “combative, antagonistic, discourteous and adversarial” 
treatment of the plaintiff, which deprived her of a fair trial and was “wholly 
inconsistent with substantial justice”). Of course, not every comment by a judge 
indicating displeasure with a lawyer constitutes grounds for reversal. State v. 
Hak, 963 A.2d 921, 929–30 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. D’Alo, 477 A.2d 89, 
92 (R.I. 1984)). For a judge’s intemperate treatment of a lawyer to require 
reversal, the judge’s comments must so prejudice the jury against the lawyer’s 
client that the client is deprived of a fair trial. People v. James, 40 P.3d 36, 42–
43 (Colo. App. 2001); Schmidt, 5 So. 3d at 1074; Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 
A.2d 268, 287 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. England, 375 A.2d 1292, 
1300 (Pa. 1977)).  
 128. 614 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 129. 908 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
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writ of mandamus.130 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed that 
the transcript of the district judge’s remarks revealed “a degree of 
anger and hostility toward the government that [was] far in excess of 
any provocation” discernible from the record.131 The judge 
suspected the government of tampering with evidence, although he 
acknowledged that his supposition of misconduct was “speculative,” 
which the Seventh Circuit branded “an understatement,”132 and later 
described as “implausible speculation.”133 Outside the presence of 
the jury, the judge repeatedly accused the prosecutors of lying, and 
he further threatened to convene hearings concerning the 
prosecutors’ perceived misconduct.134 Moreover, the judge 
apparently failed to consider the prosecutors’ explanations for why 
his suppositions were mistaken.135 
The Seventh Circuit concluded the challenged evidence should 
be admitted and, more importantly for present purposes, 
determined that on remand the case should be reassigned to a 
different district judge.136 The court reasoned reassignment was 
required because “[n]o reasonable person would fail to perceive a 
significant risk that the judge’s rulings in the case might be 
influenced by his unreasonable fury toward the prosecutors.”137 
While the decision in In re United States was based on the 
district judge’s extraordinary anger, People v. Leggett involved a 
trial judge’s pervasive denigration of a defense lawyer in front of 
the jury.138 As a result, the court in Leggett reversed the 
defendant’s conviction for carjacking and ordered a new trial.139  
Problems began during defense counsel’s cross-examination of 
the sole eyewitness to the carjacking. The judge interposed his own 
objection to the defense lawyer’s questions, calling the 
examination of the witness “irrelevant” and “silly.”140 By calling 
the cross-examination “silly,” the judge disparaged the defense 
lawyer and negated the line of questioning.141 Things further 
deteriorated during the parties’ closing arguments. During 
closings, the judge told the defense lawyer that his argument over 
                                                                                                             
 130. In re United States, 614 F.3d at 664–65. 
 131. Id. at 665. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 666. 
 134. Id. at 665. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 666. 
 137. Id. 
 138. 908 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
 139. Id. at 173. 
 140. Id. at 173–74. 
 141. Id. at 174. 
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the prosecutor’s speaking objections was “turning . . . into a 
comedy.”142 When the defense lawyer objected during the 
prosecutor’s closing, the judge not only overruled the objection but 
said to the defense lawyer, “[w]ould you behave like a 
professional, please and not a clown.”143 When the defense lawyer 
subsequently moved for a mistrial and protested that the judge’s 
treatment of him during closing arguments was outrageous, the 
court denied the motion and further responded, “you’re 
outrageous.”144 The judge also improperly asked the defense 
lawyer in the jury’s presence whether he “wished to behave like a 
gentleman” or be escorted out of the courtroom.145 
The Leggett court acknowledged that trial judges are 
sometimes required to admonish lawyers but explained that judges 
should either do so at a sidebar or first excuse the jury.146 The court 
further explained that when a judge errs and makes an injudicious 
remark about a lawyer in front of the jury, he should issue a 
curative instruction.147 In Leggett, the judge’s many intemperate 
remarks about defense counsel in the jury’s presence, and 
especially the comment that the defense lawyer was acting like a 
clown, were “simply inexcusable” and mandated a new trial before 
a different judge.148 
C. Summary 
Judges are required to be patient, dignified, and courteous 
when interacting with jurors, lawyers, parties, witnesses, and 
others in an official capacity.149 More generally, judges must 
perform their duties fairly and impartially.150 Despite their absolute 
and seemingly inflexible wording, judicial conduct rules governing 
courtesy do accommodate some intemperate behavior by judges.151 
                                                                                                             
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 175. 
 148. Id. 
 149. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2011). 
 150. See id. R. 2.2. 
 151. See, e.g., In re Disqualification of Corrigan, 826 N.E.2d 302, 303–04 
(Ohio 2004) (deciding that while “[t]he judge’s use of the word ‘jackasses’ 
when evidently referring to attorneys who behave foolishly or who resolve cases 
too slowly was unfortunate, and his reference to the clothing and jewelry worn 
by some attorneys who practice in the domestic-relations field was 
unnecessary,” such remarks did not justify the judge’s disqualification); In re 
Hamrick, 512 S.E.2d 870, 872–73 (W. Va. 1998) (declining to discipline a 
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Courts are more likely to find a judge guilty of misconduct where 
the judge has exhibited a pattern of discourteous or abusive 
behavior.152 Isolated incidents of discourtesy or abuse generally 
must be quite serious to justify discipline by state authorities or the 
reassignment of a case by a higher court. In addition, lawyers or 
litigants sometimes provoke judges’ intemperate behavior.153 The 
trend, however, is to hold judges strictly accountable for 
intemperate conduct in court, and it is plain that judges’ 
disrespectful conduct toward parties and bullying of counsel are 
increasingly “meeting with zero tolerance.”154 These are positive 
tendencies, as judges themselves agree.155 
The next step, then, is to ask what type of response by judicial 
conduct commissions and higher courts “zero tolerance” describes. 
To their credit, state supreme courts have in a number of cases 
significantly punished judges who bullied lawyers, parties, and 
others.156 In too many other cases, though, high courts have 
                                                                                                             
 
family law master who angrily rebuked a litigant who apparently misrepresented 
facts, while cautioning that the master’s actions “were not appropriate and 
definitely bordered on the need for discipline”).  
 152. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning Fowler, 696 S.E.2d 644, 646 & n.8 
(Ga. 2010) (involving a probate judge who “routinely used rude, abusive and 
insulting language towards parties”); In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d 425, 426–27 
(Iowa 1993) (reprimanding a judge for multiple instances of demeaning and 
cruel characterizations of persons who appeared before him and offering as an 
example the judge’s description of a witness as “a ‘beer-bellied, full-bearded, 
unemployed, seedy, coverall-clad lout’”); In re Walsh, 587 S.E.2d 356, 361 
(S.C. 2003) (removing judge from the bench for his history of intemperate 
courtroom behavior and his failure to modify his behavior despite being given 
the opportunity to do so); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 
873, 879 (Wash. 2010) (“One or two rude, impatient, or even condescending 
comments might be understandable—after all, no jurist is perfect. But more than 
a dozen such instances is not understandable; rather, it evidences an 
unacceptable pattern of misbehavior.”). 
 153. But see McCartney v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 526 P.2d 268, 
287 (Cal. 1974) (rejecting judge’s defense that public defender’s practice of 
filing affidavits challenging his fairness and accordingly seeking his recusal 
provoked his hostility toward members of that office), overruled on other 
grounds by Spruance v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209 (Cal. 
1975); In re Barnes, 2 So. 3d 166, 171 (Fla. 2009) (stating that alleged 
misconduct by others does not excuse a judge’s departure from the Code of 
Judicial Conduct).  
 154. Miner, supra note 31, at 1122. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See, e.g., In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 632–33, 638–39 (Fla. 2000) 
(finding that a judge violated Canon 3(B)(4), among others, through a pattern of 
abusive and hostile conduct toward lawyers, parties, witnesses, court personnel 
and other judges, and accordingly removing him from the bench); In re Inquiry 
Concerning Fowler, 696 S.E.2d 644, 646 & n.8 (Ga. 2010) (removing from 
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responded timidly to proven misconduct.157 Judges who admit 
misconduct and promise to reform are allowed to stipulate to light 
sanctions that higher courts uphold.158 Unfortunately, courts credit 
apologies and promises of personal transformation in cases where 
the judge’s misconduct is so obviously wrong that remorse and 
reformation are no answer.159  
There is certainly room for compassion, flexibility, leniency, 
and rehabilitation in judicial discipline. All judicial discipline 
cases, like all lawyer discipline cases, rise and fall on their facts. It 
is also true that agreed resolutions of disciplinary matters are a 
necessity for disciplinary systems to function efficiently. But 
judicial conduct commissions and courts must recognize that 
protecting the public and the bar, and inspiring confidence in those 
groups, requires firmness when confronting judicial bullying.  
III. RAW JUDICIAL BULLYING TO PURPORTED HUMOR 
At some point, a judge’s anger, annoyance, or impatience with 
a lawyer, litigant, juror, or witness crosses from simply regrettable 
or unfortunate conduct to judicial misconduct. In most cases this 
transformation is obvious; much like pornography, judicial conduct 
                                                                                                             
 
office a probate judge who “routinely used rude, abusive and insulting language 
towards parties . . . .”); In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 793, 
797 (Iowa 2000) (removing a judge who had “frequent conflicts with almost all 
of the people with whom she came in contact” and whose broad and deep 
hostilities “must have touched every aspect of her judicial services,” for 
violating, inter alia, Canon 3(A)(3), which is identical to Model Code Canon 
3(B)(4)); In re Lamdin, 948 A.2d 54, 65–68 (Md. 2008) (suspending judge for 
30 days without pay for repeated instances of discourteous and intemperate 
behavior); In re Walsh, 587 S.E.2d 356, 360–61 (S.C. 2003) (removing a judge 
for repeated incidents of intemperance for violating Canons 2(A) and 3(B)(4), 
among many others). 
 157. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 882 
(Wash. 2010) (suspending for a mere five days a judge who had been previously 
reprimanded, who defended her abusive behavior as a matter of judicial 
philosophy, and who stated that she did not “believe that the canons [of judicial 
conduct] [were] binding on her behavior in the courtroom”).  
 158. See, e.g., In re Perry, 586 So. 2d 1054, 1054 (Fla. 1991) (accepting 
stipulation to a public reprimand where the judge “apologize[d] for his conduct 
and agree[d] to refrain from similar conduct in the future”); Miss. Comm’n on 
Judicial Performance v. Littlejohn, 62 So. 3d 968, 972–73 (Miss. 2011) 
(accepting very light sanctions agreed upon by the parties where the judge 
admitted his serious misconduct and promised not to do it again).  
 159. See, e.g., Littlejohn, 62 So. 3d at 970 (involving a judge who jailed a 
lawyer for criminal contempt after the lawyer refused to say the pledge of 
allegiance in open court). 
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commissions and higher courts know bullying when they see it. 
Instead of simply expressing emotion, the judge under scrutiny has 
intentionally denigrated someone or purposefully trampled on a 
person’s rights. The more frequent or extreme a judge’s 
intemperance, the greater the likelihood of intervention by 
responsible authorities or higher courts.160 In other instances, a 
judge’s conduct ostensibly presents a closer call, as when an 
attempt at humor in a proceeding is better characterized as ridicule. 
A. Judges Bullying Lawyers, Parties and Others 
It seems likely that an appreciable percentage of cases in which 
judges bully lawyers are not reported to judicial conduct 
commissions or appealed on that basis because the lawyers appear 
before the offending judges with sufficient frequency that they 
must be concerned about possible retribution.161 As an alternative 
to reporting or appealing, lawyers may respond to judicial 
misconduct by using procedural mechanisms to avoid those judges 
in subsequent cases.162 Most lawyers have to be pushed quite hard 
before they will consider reporting judges’ uncivil behavior to 
authorities.163 It takes “significant courage” for lawyers who 
appear in front of abusive judges, and who may be required to do 
                                                                                                             
 160. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 28, § 3.02, at 3–4 (“Generally, a 
reviewing body will sanction a judge not only for major incidents, but also for 
an accumulation of minor, seemingly innocuous incidents that, when considered 
together, demonstrate a pattern of conduct unbecoming a member of the 
judiciary.”).  
 161. See David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in 
Federal Judicial Discipline, 76 TENN. L. REV. 909, 934 (2009) (“‘Suicidal’ is 
the adjective that comes to mind when thinking about an attorney’s report of 
judicial misconduct. While that term is certainly hyperbolic . . . the 
consequences of filing complaints against judges could well threaten an 
attorney’s career.”); see also, Attorneys Say They Fear Retribution From Tenn. 
Judges, LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticle 
Friendly.jsp?id=1202473228336 (reporting that Tennessee lawyers were afraid 
to file complaints against some judges or to move to recuse them because judges 
retaliated by dismissing cases, accusing lawyers of civil contempt, and filing 
complaints against lawyers).  
 162. Rules of civil procedure in some states permit parties to take a change of 
judge as a matter of right. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.05(a) (“A change of 
judge shall be ordered in any civil action upon the timely filing of a written 
application therefor by a party.”).  
 163. See Pimentel, supra note 161, at 920 (“The reluctance of attorneys to 
complain about judicial misconduct appears throughout the history of judicial 
ethics.”); Don Sarvey, Confronting Judicial Misconduct, PA. LAW. (Nov./Dec. 
2009), at 97 (noting “the natural and understandable caution lawyers feel about 
speaking up against judges, especially local judges, given the power they 
wield”). 
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so again, to report those judges’ misconduct to judicial conduct 
commissions or similar authorities.164 Litigants who feel that a 
judge bullied them are more likely to complain, perhaps because 
they are not repeat players in the accused judge’s court and thus do 
not fear retaliation as a lawyer might, or because they believe the 
judge’s conduct impaired their rights and they are determined to 
achieve vindication. In any event, there are a disturbing number of 
reported cases in which judges have plainly bullied lawyers, 
litigants, and others. Some exemplary cases follow. 
McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and 
Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
pitted Northern District of Texas District Judge John McBryde 
against the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit.165 The Council 
sanctioned Judge McBryde after hearing evidence of his abusive 
treatment of other judges and lawyers spanning many years.166 
United States Attorneys from two affected districts made the 
complaint of abuse that triggered these proceedings.167 The 
McBryde decision is predominantly focused on the judge’s 
constitutional challenge to his discipline, but one of the incidents 
of misconduct described in the opinion is illustrative. 
Judge McBryde had a standing pretrial order which required 
that all parties appear at settlement conferences.168 A lawyer had 
defended a corporation and its employee in a sexual harassment 
case.169 The lawyer did not have the individual defendant attend 
the settlement conference because she justifiably thought his 
presence would be counterproductive, he had no assets that would 
enable him to contribute to any settlement, and he had authorized 
the lawyer to settle on his behalf.170 Nonetheless, Judge McBryde 
was displeased and sanctioned the lawyer for her client’s failure to 
                                                                                                             
 164. In re Fuller, 798 N.W.2d 408, 419 (S.D. 2011). 
 165. 264 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 166. Id. at 54. 
 167. Pimentel, supra note 161, at 931. 
 168. McBryde, 264 F.3d at 67. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. The lawyer’s belief that the individual defendant’s presence at the 
settlement conference would be unhelpful was objectively valid. The plaintiffs 
were a mother and her ten-year old daughter. The individual defendant was 
accused of terrorizing the child by popping out his glass eye and putting it in his 
mouth in front of her. Id. Given those facts, many lawyers might think that the 
individual’s presence might alarm the child or anger the mother or both, and 
thus inhibit settlement. Moreover, the individual defendant was not financially 
able to contribute to a settlement. Id. Any settlement would have to be paid by 
the corporate defendant, which presumably sent a representative with settlement 
authority to the conference as required.  
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appear.171 After chastising the lawyer, he ordered her to attend a 
reading comprehension course and submit an affidavit swearing to 
her compliance.172 The lawyer obeyed and submitted an affidavit 
attesting to the fact she had attended a course for three hours per 
week for five weeks.173 This did not satisfy the judge, who 
questioned her truthfulness and required her to submit a 
supplemental affidavit listing each day that she attended the 
course, identifying the location of the course on each day of her 
attendance, specifying the duration of her attendance each day, and 
providing the name of a person who could confirm her attendance 
on each day listed.174 The lawyer again complied.175 The special 
committee of the Council that investigated Judge McBryde’s 
conduct characterized this incident “as reflecting a ‘gross abuse of 
power and a complete lack of empathy.’”176 The court accepted the 
committee’s assessment, describing the lawyer as “hapless counsel 
bludgeoned into taking reading comprehension courses and into 
filing demeaning affidavits, all completely marginal to the case on 
which she was working.”177 
Judge McBryde’s mandate that parties attend settlement 
conferences generally promotes settlement and is common 
practice. The lawyer should have recognized the need to file a 
motion asking that the court forego the individual defendant’s 
appearance, or to have otherwise sought to have him excused. 
Failing that, Judge McBryde might reasonably have been expected 
to scold the lawyer or to reschedule the settlement conference to 
permit the individual defendant’s attendance and perhaps even 
require the lawyer to bear any delay-related expenses. The judge’s 
angry reaction, however, was wildly disproportionate to the 
lawyer’s misjudgment. The sanction he imposed was designed to 
humiliate the lawyer rather than to induce compliance with his 
standing pretrial order, and his requirement of the second affidavit 
defied all reason. Sadly, this incident was perfectly in character 
with Judge McBryde’s alleged reputation.178 
                                                                                                             
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 68. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See generally Christine Biederman, Temper, Temper, DALLAS 
OBSERVER (Oct. 2, 1997), available at http://www.dallasobserver.com/1997-10-
02/news/temper-temper (discussing Judge McBryde’s reputation and, to 
acknowledge his supposed fairness, quoting a lawyer who described the judge as 
“an equal opportunity tyrant”).  
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The New York judge in In re Mulroy resorted to bullying a 
prosecutor because he did not like sitting in Utica, where the 
underlying case was tried, and wanted to return to his home in 
Syracuse.179 Describing Utica as a “‘f---ing black hole,’” the judge 
accused the prosecutor of over-charging the case as a felony and 
pressed her to accept a guilty plea to a misdemeanor so that he 
could get back to Syracuse for a “‘men’s night out.’”180 The judge 
threatened to declare a mistrial if the prosecutor refused to plea 
bargain.181 The prosecutor apparently held her ground and the 
judge never made good on his threat of a mistrial. When charged 
with misconduct, the judge acknowledged that he had not acted in 
a courteous and dignified manner, but contended that his “banter” 
was merely an expression of concern about a possible trial error.182 
The referee assigned to the matter rejected the judge’s argument 
and the court upheld that determination.183 The court ultimately 
removed the judge from the bench.184 
Many cases of judicial discourtesy involve denigration, 
ridicule, or other mistreatment of parties and, in particular, pro se 
litigants.185 Misdemeanor criminal defendants and litigants and 
witnesses whose lifestyles displease some judges are also frequent 
targets of bullying, as In re Hammermaster186 illustrates. The 
municipal judge charged with misconduct in In re Hammermaster 
regularly asked Hispanic defendants if they were “legal” and 
frequently “ordered them to enroll in English classes,” or to either 
become citizens or leave the country within specified times.187 The 
judge often threatened defendants with life imprisonment or 
indefinite incarceration until they paid fines or costs.188 He 
ridiculed a defendant who was suffering from bipolar disorder 
when the defendant attempted to explain his condition at 
sentencing.189 In another case, he criticized a defendant’s 
                                                                                                             
 179. 731 N.E.2d 120, 122 (N.Y. 2000). 
 180. Id. at 122 (quoting the judge). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 122–23. 
 184. Id. at 123. 
 185. See, e.g., In re Moroney, 914 P.2d 570, 571–72 (Kan. 1996) (finding 
that the judge violated Canon 3(A)(3), which tracks Model Code Canon 3(B)(4), 
when he belittled a pro se litigant); In re Ellender, 16 So. 3d 351, 352–53 (La. 
2010) (involving a judge’s rude and impatient treatment of pro se litigants); In 
re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 879 (Wash. 2010) 
(involving judges’ repeated abuse of pro se litigants). 
 186. 985 P.2d 924 (Wash. 1999). 
 187. Id. at 927, 933–34. 
 188. Id. at 928. 
 189. Id. at 932–33. 
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“meretricious relationship” with his fiancée, which supposedly 
impaired the defendant’s ability to pay his fine because the woman 
was “freeloading off” him.190 To encourage what he considered to 
be more responsible behavior by the defendant, the judge 
threatened to order the fiancée to sell her car if it was not timely 
licensed and insured.191 For these and other instances of bullying, 
the Washington Supreme Court suspended the judge without pay 
for six months.192  
In In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Michelson,193 a defendant appearing before Wisconsin municipal 
court judge Robert Michelson told the judge she could not pay her 
fine because she had to care for her two grandchildren as a result 
of her daughter’s illness.194 Judge Michelson responded that he 
could not accept that excuse because the woman had no legal 
obligation to support her grandchildren.195 The judge then asked 
the woman why the children’s father could not support them.196 
The woman responded that the older child’s father could not be 
located and the identity of the younger child’s father was 
unknown.197 Upon hearing that response, Judge Michelson 
“became angry and said, ‘I suppose it was too much to ask that 
your daughter keep her pants on and not behave like a slut.’”198 
Judge Michelson then declared the daughter should not have had 
children if she could not support them.199 He ultimately established 
a monthly payment plan to allow the woman to pay her fine.200 
Agreeing with a judicial conduct panel that the judge’s remarks 
were discourteous, intemperate, and undignified, and further 
evidenced socioeconomic bias, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
reprimanded him.201 
B. From Humor to Ridicule 
The judicial bullying described in the McBryde, In re Mulroy, 
In re Hammermaster, and Michelson opinions was glaring. Other 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. at 933. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 943. 
 193. 591 N.W.2d 843 (Wis. 1999). 
 194. Id. at 844. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 844–45. 
 197. Id. at 845. 
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 201. Id. at 845–46. 
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instances of bullying may be less obvious initially, as where judges 
use purported humor in their opinions to cruel effect. This is not to 
say that humor in judicial opinions is uniformly undesirable.202 
Humor and figurative language may demystify the law, crystallize 
issues or illustrate points, help place issues in context, animate 
facts, and make opinions more readable.203 Unfortunately, judges’ 
attempts at humor often suggest to some litigants that the court did 
not take their cases seriously or decide them fairly, serve only to 
offend or ridicule the participants, or are at best insensitive. It is a 
rare judge who can effectively employ humor in an opinion.204 On 
the other hand: 
If one accepts the proposition that a judge who directs 
biting humor at a litigant or an attorney commits an act of 
aggression, it is easy to see why humor is offensive. It is 
not a fair fight: The judge gets to have the first and last 
word on the matter. The subject of the judge’s ridicule has 
no recourse but to accept the joke and the accompanying 
humiliation.205  
High courts generally discourage and disfavor humor in 
opinions. As the Iowa Supreme Court once observed, 
“[f]lamboyance in decorum and attempts at clever ridicule are not 
admired characteristics” in a judge.206 
For a textbook example of judicial bullying in the guise of 
humor, we return to the court of former U.S. District Judge Samuel 
B. Kent to examine his caustic opinion in Bradshaw v. Unity Marine 
Corp.207 In Bradshaw, Judge Kent persistently ridiculed two lawyers 
whose performance he considered inadequate. The plaintiff, John 
                                                                                                             
 202. See Adalberto Jordan, Imagery, Humor, and the Judicial Opinion, 41 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 693, 699–701 (1987) (offering some benefits of employing 
humor and figurative language in judicial opinions).  
 203. Id. at 700–01. 
 204. One who does effectively employ humor in opinions is Judge Alex 
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit. See Gerald Lebovits, Judicial Jesting: Judicious?, 
75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 64 (Sept. 2003) (discussing Judge Kozinski’s rare talent and 
suggesting that most judges should not attempt to write like him). The late 
Terence Evans of the Seventh Circuit was another.  
 205. Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 237, 272 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 206. In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1993).  
 207. Bradshaw v. Unity Marine, 147 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
Many lawyers who read Judge Kent’s opinion in Bradshaw found it humorous. 
One who did not was Northwestern University law professor Steven Lubet, a 
judicial ethics expert, who characterized Judge Kent as a “martinet” and 
properly described his opinion in Bradshaw as “bullying.” Lubet, supra note 26, 
at 15, 12.  
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Bradshaw, was a seaman on a tugboat who was injured when he 
attempted to climb from the boat onto a Phillips Petroleum 
Company dock.208 Phillips initially moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that Bradshaw’s first amended complaint, which brought 
Phillips into the case, was untimely because it was filed after the 
Texas two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims had 
run.
209
 Bradshaw, on the other hand, insisted his claim against 
Phillips was timely because it was governed by the three-year 
federal statute of limitations for maritime personal injuries.210 This 
left the court to decide whether maritime law or state law controlled 
Bradshaw’s claims.211 In short, this was a straightforward personal 
injury case requiring simple application of the Erie doctrine. Many 
cases like it had surely come before. Indeed, as Judge Kent noted, 
the answer to the question presented at summary judgment could be 
“readily ascertained.”212 It is therefore reasonable to question why 
Judge Kent would designate his opinion for publication unless he 
wanted to publicly humiliate the lawyers for Bradshaw and for 
Phillips.213 Humiliate them he did. 
After briefly outlining the facts of the case and framing the 
issue for decision, Judge Kent launched his assault on the lawyers. 
He began:  
Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case 
involves two extremely likable lawyers, who have together 
delivered some of the most amateurish pleadings ever to 
cross the hallowed causeway into Galveston, an effort 
which leads the Court to surmise but one plausible 
explanation. Both attorneys have obviously entered into a 
secret pact—complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic 
words—to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the 
back side of gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope 
that the Court would be so charmed by their child-like 
efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their 
briefing would go unnoticed. Whatever actually occurred, 
the Court is now faced with the daunting task of 
deciphering their submissions. With Big Chief tablet 
readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care 
                                                                                                             
 208. Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 669. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 671–72. 
 212. Id. at 671. 
 213. See Lubet, supra note 26, at 13 (“[T]he only possible purpose for 
publication was to add to the embarrassment of the attorneys.”). 
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laugh in the face of death, life on the razor’s edge sense of 
exhilaration, the Court begins.214  
Continuing, Judge Kent stated the standard for granting 
summary judgment and briefly explained the burden-shifting that 
takes place at summary judgment. He then resumed his assault on 
the lawyers, asserting that Phillips’s counsel had begun a “descent 
into Alice’s Wonderland” by citing but a single case in Phillips’s 
summary judgment motion—a case that basically stated the Erie 
doctrine—without explaining its relevance.215 Moreover, the judge 
complained, Phillips’s lawyer did not even cite to the Texas statute 
of limitations that Phillips claimed governed the case.216 “A more 
bumbling approach [was] difficult to conceive,” Judge Kent wrote 
before signaling his intent to criticize Bradshaw’s lawyer by 
stating, “but wait folks, There’s More!”217 
Bradshaw reportedly answered Phillips’s “deft, yet minimalist 
analytical wizardry with an equally gossamer wisp of an 
argument,” although Judge Kent did acknowledge that Bradshaw’s 
lawyer at least cited the federal statute establishing the limitation 
period for maritime personal injury claims.218 Bradshaw’s lawyer’s 
work was hardly stellar, however, as Judge Kent made clear: 
Naturally, Plaintiff also neglects to provide any analysis 
whatsoever of why his claim versus Defendant Phillips is a 
maritime action. Instead, Plaintiff “cites” to a single case 
from the Fourth Circuit. Plaintiff’s citation, however, points 
to a nonexistent Volume “1886” of the Federal Reporter 
Third edition and neglects to provide a pinpoint citation for 
what, after being located, turned out to be a forty-page 
decision. . . . The Court cannot even begin to comprehend 
why this case was selected for reference. It is almost as if 
Plaintiff’s counsel chose the opinion by throwing long 
range darts at the Federal reporter (remarkably enough 
hitting a nonexistent volume!).219 
After that comparatively gentle rebuke, Judge Kent turned to 
Bradshaw’s supplemental briefing, which, while containing 
relevant authority, still failed to explain why Bradshaw’s claim 
against Phillips sounded in maritime law. Bradshaw seemed to 
argue that he had sufficiently pled a maritime personal injury claim 
                                                                                                             
 214. Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 670. 
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against Phillips because he had adequately alleged such a claim 
versus his employer and the vessel on which he worked. That 
reasoning was doomed to fail because admiralty law must be 
invoked against each defendant individually.220 Despite this critical 
flaw, Judge Kent sarcastically commended Bradshaw “for his 
vastly improved choice of crayon—Brick Red is much easier on 
the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better amidst the 
mustard splotched about [Bradshaw’s] briefing.”221 “But at the end 
of the day,” the court continued, “even if you put a calico dress on 
it and call it Florence, a pig is still a pig.”222 
Finally, Judge Kent reached the core of Philips’s motion, 
introducing his analysis by writing, “[n]ow, alas, the Court must 
return to grownup land.”223 Describing the pivotal issue as whether 
state law or maritime law controlled Bradshaw’s claim against 
Phillips—an answer that could be “readily ascertained”—Judge 
Kent explained that under Fifth Circuit precedent, a dock owner’s 
duty to the crew of a vessel using its dock is clearly defined by 
state law.224 As a result, Bradshaw’s claim against Phillips was 
subject to the two-year statute of limitation provided by Texas law 
and was therefore time-barred.225 The court mockingly sustained 
Phillips’s summary judgment motion. 
After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier, 
having received no useful guidance whatsoever from either 
party, the Court has endeavored, primarily based upon its 
affection for both counsel, but also out of its own sense of 
morbid curiosity, to resolve what it perceived to be the 
legal issue presented. Despite the waste of perfectly good 
crayon seen in both parties’ briefing (and the inexplicable 
odor of wet dog emanating from such) the Court believes 
that it has satisfactorily resolved this matter.226  
That conclusion did not terminate Judge Kent’s torment of 
Bradshaw’s counsel, however, since Bradshaw still had a claim 
against his employer, Unity Marine Corporation.  
Plaintiff retains, albeit seemingly to his befuddlement 
and/or consternation, a maritime law cause of action versus 
. . . Unity Marine. . . . However, it is well known around 
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2012] BULLIES ON THE BENCH 355 
 
 
 
these parts that Unity Marine’s lawyer . . . has been writing 
crisply in ink since the second grade. Some old-timers even 
spin yarns of an ability to type. . . . [O]ut of caution, the 
Court suggests that Plaintiff’s lovable counsel had best 
upgrade to a nice shiny No. 2 pencil or at least sharpen 
what’s left of the stubs of his crayons for what remains of 
this heart-stopping, spine-tingling action.227 
The court concluded this passage with a footnote containing yet 
another insult of Bradshaw’s lawyer derived from the “No. 2 
pencil” and crayon-sharpening comments: “[T]he Court cautions 
Plaintiff’s counsel not to run with a sharpened writing utensil in 
hand—he could put his eye out.”228 
There is nothing funny about the Bradshaw opinion. It is 
principally a collage of mixed metaphors and disconnected 
juvenile taunts. Several of the judge’s attempts at humor make no 
sense whatsoever.229 The opinion is discourteous, disrespectful, 
and undignified, and in writing it, Judge Kent plainly violated 
Canon 3A(3) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.230 It 
is worth examining the opinion further, however, to understand 
why its issuance is properly characterized as bullying. 
To start, let’s assume that the quality of the summary judgment 
briefing in the Bradshaw case was as amateurish as Judge Kent 
suggested. Further assume that grossly substandard legal writing 
imposes a burden on courts for the simple reason that even the 
most diligent courts rely on counsel for the parties to provide the 
majority of the legal argument in litigated cases.231 Judge Kent had 
options short of public ridicule to improve the quality of the 
lawyers’ work and, in so doing, enhance the quality of his 
decision-making. For example, he could have required the parties 
                                                                                                             
 227. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 228. Id. n.4. 
 229. Why, for example, would summary judgment briefing so bad as to be 
described as “child-like” cause the judge to offer or experience “a devil-may-
care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor’s edge sense of exhilaration”? 
Id. at 670. 
 230. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(3) (2009) 
(“A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official 
capacity.”). 
 231. See DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
LITIGATION 462 (2011) (“No matter how diligent they may be, judges and law 
clerks can never know as much about cases as the lawyers do. As a result, courts 
necessarily rely on lawyers to present most facts and argument.”). This 
assumption does not actually apply here because the issue presented at summary 
judgment could be “readily ascertained.” Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 671. 
Even so, the assumption is worth making for illustrative purposes. 
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to withdraw their motion papers and resubmit them, or he might 
have ordered them to file supplemental briefing and, either way, 
made clear in respectful terms his great unhappiness with the 
quality of the work originally submitted. He could have held oral 
argument on Phillips’s motion and forced the lawyers to clearly 
articulate their positions and to substantiate them with citations to 
authority. If he simply wanted to penalize the lawyers for their 
abysmal efforts, he possibly could have sanctioned them using his 
inherent powers,232 or perhaps he could have invoked 28 U.S.C. § 
1927 to sanction them.233 A show cause order requiring the 
lawyers to demonstrate why they should not be sanctioned for their 
slipshod briefing probably would have been equally effective.234 
For that matter, if the judge thought that the lawyers’ performance 
was truly incompetent, he could have filed ethics complaints 
against them.235 Milder, but nonetheless significant, punitive 
options might have included castigating them in a letter, or 
chastising them at oral argument or in a chambers conference. 
                                                                                                             
 232. Courts have inherent authority to sanction the misconduct of lawyers 
practicing before them. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) 
(discussing inherent powers of federal district courts); Kaina v. Gellman, 197 
P.3d 776, 782–83 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Bank of Haw. v. Kunimoto, 
984 P.2d 1198, 1213 (Haw. 1999)); Cimenian v. Lumb, 951 A.2d 817, 820 (Me. 
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Hernandez, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that 
California trial courts’ inherent powers do not include imposing monetary 
sanctions). In extreme circumstances, however, it may include the discretion to 
dismiss a case. Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 793 (7th 
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other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any 
Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably 
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess 
costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such 
conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006). 
 234. Presumably the lawyers would have defended against the imposition of 
sanctions on any basis by arguing that they had not acted in bad faith in filing 
their deficient motion papers. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice 
Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring “willful bad 
faith” to impose attorneys’ fees under § 1927); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative 
Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 518 (D. Md. 2010) (stating that a district court’s 
inherent authority “only may be exercised to sanction ‘bad-faith conduct’”) 
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.32, 50 (1991)).  
 235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010) (“A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation.”).  
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Shunning all those reasonable alternatives, Judge Kent settled on 
public shaming, which principally served to showcase his wit.  
The two lawyers who were the target of Judge Kent’s derision 
were unable to effectively defend themselves, as the judge 
certainly knew. There was no hearing at which the lawyers could 
address the court in their defense. Had they filed a motion to 
reconsider or some other pleading challenging the court’s 
characterization of their performance, they would have exposed 
themselves to further ridicule. Any related suggestion that the 
judge had violated judicial ethics rules by denigrating them might 
well have provoked some form of retribution by the judge. 
Although lawyers may appeal from final orders imposing non-
monetary sanctions, critical statements in opinions generally 
cannot be appealed under the final judgment rule.236 Even appellate 
courts that take comparatively lenient approaches to allowing 
lawyers to appeal from scoldings administered by lower courts still 
require (1) that judicial criticism be expressly denominated as a 
reprimand and thus appropriately characterized as a sanction; or 
(2) that the trial court make specific findings of professional 
misconduct.237 At the time of the Bradshaw decision the Fifth 
Circuit followed the second approach, as it does to this day.238 In 
any event, Judge Kent did neither of those things in his summary 
judgment order. No courts permit lawyers to appeal from routine 
judicial criticism or commentary on their performance.239 
Bradshaw must have been stunned by the opinion. Judge 
Kent’s snide comment about a “remarkably long walk on a short 
legal pier” had to be particularly galling since Bradshaw was 
injured when disembarking from a boat onto a dock.240 The judge’s 
reference to the “odor of wet dog”241 that emanated from the 
parties’ pleadings trivialized Bradshaw’s claims.242 Little in the 
opinion would have suggested to Bradshaw that Judge Kent even 
took his case seriously. Instead, the opinion might well have ruined 
Bradshaw’s relationship with his lawyer, who Judge Kent had 
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clearly and publicly branded incompetent. Any such harm would 
have had immediate consequences, inasmuch as Bradshaw had to 
consider the prospects of success on his claims against the 
remaining defendant, Unity Marine. Given Judge Kent’s opinion, 
how could Bradshaw reasonably have confidence in his lawyer 
going forward? Regardless, Bradshaw could not force Judge Kent 
to vacate his opinion.243 Because Judge Kent’s grant of summary 
judgment to Phillips appears to have been legally correct,244 
Bradshaw had no valid basis for appeal. There being no apparent 
ground for reversal, this was not a case in which the Fifth Circuit 
could have used its supervisory powers to assign a different judge 
upon remand.  
Granted, the lawyers or Bradshaw could have complained 
about Judge Kent’s conduct to the Judicial Council of the Fifth 
Circuit, but that option was unlikely to afford them satisfaction. 
From the lawyers’ standpoint, the damage was done as soon as the 
opinion became available on Westlaw and LexisNexis; the Council 
would never have acted so hastily as to prevent the opinion’s 
electronic publication or, for that matter, its print publication in the 
Federal Supplement—assuming the Council would have in fact 
determined that Judge Kent committed misconduct and that the 
opinion should be withdrawn. With all due respect to the many fine 
judges on the Fifth Circuit, that is not a reliable assumption. 
Consider that when Judge Kent was originally found to have 
committed two acts of serious sexual misconduct involving his 
former case manager, Cathy McBroom, which ultimately led to his 
indictment, the Council reprimanded him, suspended him with pay 
for four months, and relocated his chambers from Galveston to 
Houston.245 That relatively light penalty for arguably impeachable 
misconduct hardly inspires confidence that the Council would have 
sanctioned Judge Kent for his distemper in Bradshaw. 
Furthermore, the lawyers had to be concerned that making a 
complaint against Judge Kent would expose them and their clients 
to his wrath in any other cases that came before him. They could 
not have avoided that risk by seeking his recusal in those cases. 
Although 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) requires a district judge to 
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disqualify himself “where he has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party,”246 such an infirmity must arise from an 
extrajudicial source.247 That was not the case here.248 While 28 
U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a judge to disqualify himself where “his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned,”249 Judge Kent’s 
denigration of both lawyers in Bradshaw militated against any 
claim of partiality.250 
Long story short, the lawyers and plaintiff in Bradshaw were 
essentially powerless to prevent their deliberate humiliation by 
Judge Kent. Judge Kent held all the cards. Although there are cases 
in which lawyers may be embarrassed deservedly by a court’s 
comments on their conduct, as where sanctions are imposed or 
contempt is found, there is a vast difference between a judge’s 
necessarily harsh condemnation of a lawyer’s work or conduct and 
the publication of gratuitous insults.251 There is never a place for 
the latter. No matter how flawed the lawyers’ performances in 
Bradshaw, their errors were mild in comparison to Judge Kent’s.252  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Regulating judges’ demeanors is a difficult task. Judges are 
human, and they may occasionally display anger or annoyance. 
Even judges who enjoy impressive self-control may sometimes 
lose patience when dealing with incompetent or uncivil lawyers, or 
unusually difficult or disruptive litigants. Lawyers and litigants 
sometimes incite judges. Moreover, judicial candor is a highly 
valued trait and judges must enjoy some flexibility in criticizing 
the performance of lawyers who appear before them. We generally 
consider trial and appellate lawyers to have thick skins; indeed, 
tolerating judicial criticism is an ordinary rigor of trial and 
appellate practice. At the same time, judges are held to high 
standards of conduct, and their inability to comply with 
professional norms erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 
If some intemperate behavior by judges is to be expected and 
even tolerated up to a point, there is no justification for judges 
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behaving like bullies. Judges who abuse lawyers, litigants, jurors, 
witnesses, and others who appear before them do great damage to 
the judiciary as a whole. Parties, jurors, and witnesses who do not 
regularly appear in court and who are bullied when they do are 
likely to form lasting negative impressions about the justice 
system. Targets of judicial bullying may be left with the 
impression that they were treated unfairly, that the court did not 
take their cases seriously, or that “justice” is the province of a 
privileged few. Judicial bullying may chill zealous advocacy. For 
example, lawyers who reasonably apprehend abuse or ridicule by a 
judge known for such behavior may be tempted to avoid making 
good faith arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law out of the concern that their reward for doing so will 
be denigration or public humiliation.253 Lawyers who do confront 
judicial bullies risk retaliation against them and their clients in that 
case and others. 
Fortunately, courts and judicial conduct commissions are 
increasingly demonstrating their willingness to curb the bullying of 
the minority of judges who engage in it. They must continue to do 
so. In some cases, significant disciplinary action such as 
suspension without pay and removal from the bench may be 
required. It is clearly insufficient, for example, for a vengeful 
judge such as Talmadge Littlejohn, who jailed a lawyer for 
refusing to recite the pledge of allegiance, to escape with a public 
reprimand and a paltry $100 fine.254 Among other problems, the 
failure to meaningfully discipline judges who engage in serious 
misconduct discourages lawyers from reporting such incidents to 
appropriate authorities. It is also worth considering whether there 
is a need for more proactive measures, such as continuing 
education programs, that may be effective in avoiding or reducing 
abusive conduct by judges. One way or the other, there is simply 
no room for bullies on the bench.  
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